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This article engages with and aims to advance the debate about Decoloniz-
ing geography, examining its approach to knowledge and its implications 
for the discipline. Decolonizers draw heavily upon social constructivist 
and historically-rooted notions of knowledge which emphasize its em-
beddedness in power relations. While shedding light on the social and 
political conditions under which knowledge is produced is valuable, its 
context-dependent view of knowledge limits its scope to account for disci-
plinary knowledge. Taking a particularistic epistemology which conflates 
knowledge with experience is insufficient to explain the historical evolution 
of theoretical and disciplinary frameworks. Denying the potential for and 
even the desirability of context-independent (theoretical) knowledge De-
colonizing geography can be read as post-disciplinary and post-universal, 
potentially denying that geography can offer all students, regardless of their 
background, access to powerful knowledge and insights. Here, social real-
ism is proposed as an alternative approach to knowledge which accounts 
for both the social context of knowledge production and its distinctive epis-
temic qualities. An epistemological framework for geography is examined 
which demonstrates the relationship between propositional (conceptual), 
contextual and procedural knowledge, and why all three are essential for 
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1. Introduction
The 2017 RGS/IBG annual conference theme was “Decolonizing Geographical Knowledges – open-ing the discipline out to the world”. In special 
conference-editions of Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers and Area, as well as at the confer-
ence itself, Decolonizing the discipline was presented by 
Jazeel as an “imperative” for all geographers to consider 
[1]. What is meant by Decolonizing disciplinary knowl-
edge? 
Making reference to what they call “the shine and 
shadow of powerful knowledge”, Rudolph, Sriprakash 
and Gerrard propose that “Both the production and use 
of knowledge (disciplinary and non-disciplinary) have 
been implicated by these colonial and racial violences”, 
adding that epistemic violence has resulted from “order-
ing, classification and naming that occurs through the 
practices of colonialism” [2]. Hence, they call for closer 
scrutiny of the historical circumstances in which knowl-
edge was produced, which they suggest equates with the 
global North. 
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Writing in Transactions, Jazeel himself finds the very 
process of abstraction and theory-making within the disci-
pline of geography problematic: 
What I want to stress therefore is that we must remain 
continually vigilant against the authoritative prescription 
of any “correct theoretical practice” (Spivak 1985, 346) 
for Decolonizing geographical knowledge, because it is 
precisely the representational containment of geography’s 
theoretical orthodoxies that battens the hatches against 
the outside, the minor, the excluded. In other words, post-
colonial geography must itself be situated within the polit-
ical economy of academic knowledge production [3].
For Jazeel, geographical theory has become something 
that potentially excludes those outside of the discipline 
rather than something from which they might learn.
Yet, it is worth pausing and reflecting on where this 
well-intention, “themed intervention” might take our dis-
cipline before geographers head too far down this path. At 
one level, the call to diversify geographical knowledge, 
to open the discipline to a wider audience and to move 
away from a Western-centric narrative sounds progressive 
and common sense. Yet, at the same time, why is it that 
in 2017-18, decades after colonialism was discredited, 
that some academics are asserting the need to “Decolo-
nize” disciplinary knowledge? And, why is Decolonizing 
geography presented as an “imperative” for changing the 
discipline, and how it is taught, rather than as a topic for 
analysis and debate about the way knowledge is produced 
and in which settings? 
2. Objectives and Method
This article takes a theoretical and interpretivist approach 
to examine the debate about Decolonizing geography. I 
begin by analysing its particularistic approach to epis-
temology as well as its origins. I will show how the im-
perative to Decolonize the curriculum grows out of and 
extrapolates previous assumptions about knowledge, 
especially its political and socially-rooted nature. Indeed, 
advocates for Decolonizing geography claim that they are 
expanding ideas from “postcolonial and subaltern studies, 
black studies and critical Indigenous theory, queer and 
feminist theory” [4], although some assumptions are shared 
across other social sciences. While this field has added 
new insights, experiences and stories to light which were 
insufficiently represented in geography, its particularistic 
approach is unable to distinguish between context-depen-
dent and context-independent knowledge, and hence offer 
a theory of disciplinary knowledge. 
Here, I draw on the sociological theory of social re-
alism to propose an alternative way to conceptualise 
knowledge, one that seeks to account for both con-
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text-dependent and context-independent knowledge. 
Social realism aims to differentiate between knowledge 
types, such as personal, everyday knowledge and the-
oretical, scientific knowledge. And, it seeks to account 
for how knowledge is produced, the procedures and 
methods of verification that are specific to a disciplinary 
community. Next, I apply social realism to the discipline 
of geography and examine its evolution and traditions. 
I show that the distinction between the study of phe-
nomena in one place versus their form originated in the 
nineteenth century and has persisted to present day geog-
raphy. Here, I suggest that geography does have its own 
epistemology and knowledge structure which is danger 
of being overlooked in Decolonizing narratives. Finally, 
I show why induction into this disciplinary framework 
and modes of reasoning is necessary if education is to be 
a powerful, transcendental experience. 
3. Does Geography need Decolonizing? 
“The geographical discipline has also been exposed as a 
handmaiden of empire, providing its experts, maps and 
institutions,” reports Legg [5]. That the evolution of geog-
raphy and empire in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
went hand in hand is in little dispute. David Livingston’s 
The Geographical Tradition recounts this story in some 
detail. Yet, Decolonizers go much further than this, as-
serting that knowledge in the present is “implicated” 
by its colonial past: “decolonial scholars argue that the 
modern episteme is always and intrinsically saturated 
with coloniality although it is insecure in its reach and 
depth” suggests Radcliffe [6]. Yet, the discipline and the 
practices of geographers today are very different from 
the colonial era, an important point that is glossed over 
in decolonial discourse. While many eighteenth and 
nineteenth century geographical expeditions were backed 
by government and/or monarchy, clearly that is not the 
case today. 
Radcliffe also makes reference to “power relations in 
the colonial present”, which she proposes “permeate all 
forms of knowing about and understanding the world” 
[7]. Similarly, Collard et al. propose that “knowledge pro-
duction and everyday relations are informed by European 
colonial modalities of power and propped up by imperial 
geopolitics and economic arrangements” [8]. It would be 
naïve of academics not to consider the geopolitical and 
economic arrangements when conducting any given study. 
However, it is not clear what or where she is referring to 
by the “colonial present”. Powerful nations like the USA 
and China may well engage in exploitative practices (eco-
nomic and political) in many countries around the world, 
but they are not colonial powers in the sense of a nine-
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teenth century Britain or Spain. The difference needs to be 
made more explicit. 
For Decolonizers it is evident that context is king. 
This applies to both the historical context of knowledge 
production and current social, economic and political 
context in which knowledge is applied. Rob Moore notes 
that since the cultural turn of the 1970s the dominant 
view in the sociology of education, and reflected in 
social theories of phenomenology, ethnomethodology, 
postmodernism and post-structuralism, has been that 
“knowledge is socially constructed, historically located 
and intrinsically connected with power” (author’s italics) 
[9]. Indicatively, such theories have taken us away from 
the very idea and importance of theoretical knowledge, 
and therefore away from a common basis for under-
standing the world. Hence, Noxolo arrives at the notion 
of a “pluriversality of knowledges” [10], indicating that 
they have moved away from the notion of a university 
that generates specialist knowledge, which is potentially 
accessible to all (i.e. universal).
Here, knowledge is embedded in social practice, and 
hence, Baldwin demands of geography scholars: “an 
abiding recognition that knowledge, all knowledge, is po-
litical”[11]. Yet, we might want to qualify Balwin’s proposi-
tion. All knowledge is potentially political. It depends on 
the context in which it is used. The knowledge that rivers 
erode the land and deposit material downstream may have 
political consequences when applied to a river that cross-
es a political boundary for instance, but, by itself, is this 
knowledge political? Once river erosion and deposition 
have been accepted concepts in a discipline they are used 
by scholars and students all over the world, giving them a 
universal quality. 
Let us proceed by acknowledging that context matters a 
lot, especially in a subject like geography. Everything we 
learn transpires in a particular cultural and social setting. 
The concepts we use to make sense of and to think about 
the world around us are learnt through social interaction 
and by using them in different contexts. When we get 
them “wrong” – meaning our use of them does not make 
sense to those around us – we must either modify our un-
derstanding of the concept or we are likely to experience a 
similar type of miscommunication in the future. We learn 
concepts and they gain meaning for us through social in-
teraction, including when meanings change or new ones 
are created. This applies to both every day and theoretical 
concepts. For this reason it is misleading to suggest, as 
social constructionist sometimes do, that when individuals 
learn they “construct knowledge”. The student may ac-
quire new meaning as they study, but very rarely do they 
generate new knowledge. 
Second, ideas are powerful and do have serious impli-
cations in society – socially, environmentally, economi-
cally and politically. It would be foolish to suggest other-
wise. It is well-known that nineteenth century colonialism 
was fed by ideas of racial superiority linked to theories 
of Social Darwinism. Over time, society questioned and 
challenged the application of naturalist theories as ill-suit-
ed to human nature and were superseded by more egal-
itarian ideas about our humanity, reveals Malik [12]. This 
is one very important reason why we need to be able to 
distinguish between better and worse ideas (and more/less 
accurate theories) and to distinguish between different 
knowledge domains. And, as Jim Butcher [13] cautions, we 
need to be careful to distinguish between the production 
of knowledge and its application in a given political set-
tings. The two are not the same thing. And, just because 
knowledge is used for immoral acts does not mean the 
knowledge itself is flawed. Social movements may take a 
progressive idea and apply it in a harmful way. 
The social context of knowledge production also mat-
ters – our thoughts, questions and interpretation of find-
ings are all influenced by the cultural setting in which one 
lives and works. Social constructivist theories have helped 
us to better understand how context influences knowledge 
production. It has helped us to gain a deeper appreciation 
of the role of the human subject in knowledge construc-
tion, whereas prior theory tended to treat knowledge as a 
given. As Jennifer Negal observes, “Knowledge demands 
some kind of access to a fact on the part of a living sub-
ject” [14]. The role of the human subject in making and 
accessing knowledge is an important part of epistemology, 
something we have learnt from the work of Lev Vygotsky 
among others (see Derry [15]). 
So, context matters for all these reasons. But, this 
doesn’t mean that we are prisoners of circumstance. As 
Alexander notes: 
Theoretical knowledge can never be anything other 
than the socially rooted efforts of historical agents. But 
this social character of knowledge does not negate the 
possibility of developing either generalised categories or 
increasingly disciplined, impersonal and critical modes of 
evaluation [16].
There are two ways in which it is possible to transcend 
context: individual reason and procedural knowledge ap-
plied in a scholarly community. 
As noted above, individuals learn through social inter-
action. This is how they acquire concepts and meanings 
that constitute language – both every day language and 
specialist knowledge. Once mastered, we use these con-
cepts to think – they are tools for making sense of the 
world around us. Again, Vygotsky’s work provides insight 
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into the interplay between thought and language. But, as 
Robert Brandom shows concepts are not necessarily fixed 
and they do not exist in isolation from other concepts [17]. 
As subjective beings we are capable of modifying our 
understanding of a concept or even rejecting it altogeth-
er, if, for example, we were to find a better concept. The 
same applies to theories. Over time, some theories are 
superseded by more accurate or sophisticated theories. 
For instance, convection currents as an explanation for 
plate movement has recently been challenged by the idea 
of slab-pull during plate subduction [18]. In order for new 
ideas or theories to become accepted theoretical knowl-
edge depends upon acceptance by the disciplinary com-
munity. This occurs through a process of reasoned scru-
tiny by individuals (peer review) and through collective 
dialogue with a commitment to a seeking better explana-
tions or approximations towards truth [19].
Disciplines need ways of distinguishing between better 
and worse knowledge. This is achieved through procedur-
al knowledge (explored further below). Disciplines have 
created tried and tested methods and procedures of veri-
fying the accuracy of new ideas. New findings or theories 
(like the Anthropocene) should only become accepted 
after rigorous scrutiny by a disciplinary community. It is 
through such procedures that ideas are able to transcend 
the context in which they were produced – demographic 
transition and Newton’s Laws of Motion being two wor-
thy examples. 
This is in no way to dismiss the contribution to knowl-
edge of minorities or “excluded” people Decolonizers 
seek to highlight. Contextual knowledge has an important 
role to play in understanding the particular circumstances 
of people in a given locality, at a given time. However, 
geography is not an amalgam of millions of unconnected 
accounts. The point is to learn from them, to identify some 
common trends, experiences and patterns of interaction. 
This involves abstracting from context in order to work 
towards a theory of understanding spatial interactions at 
the surface of the earth. 
Through identification of common experiences and 
patterns of behaviour, geography explores an aspect of 
truth about human experiences and planetary interactions. 
“Knowledge links a subject to truth” finds Nagel [20] and 
hence is a means for developing our subjectivity. Social 
constructivists are mistaken in the assertion that “scientific 
truths are no more than what scientists at the time say is 
true” suggests Young[21], because they have not sufficiently 
taken account of the relationship between knowledge and 
the object under analysis. There is a difference between 
belief and knowledge, which Nagel calls factivity: “We 
can only know facts or true propositions”, whereas, “belief 
can easily link a subject to a false proposition” [22]. Nagel 
gives a simple example, “Bill thinks his door is locked, 
but it isn’t” [23]. Each discipline has developed its own 
procedures by which knowledge is tested and verified, and 
thus a basis upon which judgements about the reliability 
of knowledge are made. 
It is the deeply-rooted or over-socialised view of 
knowledge that leads some Decolonizers to question 
the feasibility of context-independent knowledge. Here, 
knowledge and the knower become inseparable and there 
is a risk that knowledge gets reduced to a matter of per-
spective. Making reference to postmodern approaches to 
knowledge, Young writes: 
[I]n dismissing other theories rather than entering into 
a dialogue with them, postmodernism precludes the pos-
sibility of an alternative theory of knowledge, except one 
that reduces all knowledge to experiences or statements 
about knowers [24].
Young draws on the work of Rob Moore and Johan 
Muller who identify a drift towards relativism in literature 
on “voice discourses”. He surmises, “There is no knowl-
edge for the voice discourses, only the power of some 
groups to assert that their experiences should count as 
knowledge” (author’s italics) [25]. This view is echoed in 
the article by Rudolph, Sriprakash and Gerrard [26] where 
they surmise that traditional disciplines are ill-equipped 
to deal with the experiences of gay people, minorities 
and women, as if the purpose of a discipline were only to 
articulate the experiences of a particular group in society. 
Despite their call to “bring history back in”, this is an 
ahistorical view of what disciplinary knowledge is. Below, 
I say more about geography’s evolution as a discipline, 
and who contributed to its development. 
This relativist turn in academia is part of a wider rejec-
tion of the idea that some knowledge is better than other 
knowledge, or culture for that matter. Because “better 
knowledge” or “better culture” (or Culture with a capital 
“C”) are associated with and often monopolised by elites 
they have been recast as simply one standpoint next to 
others, as Moore observes: 
The reason why Culture might be confused with the 
culture of the ruling class is that part of what being a 
ruling class entails is having privileged access to Culture 
and the capacity to partially recontextualize it within its 
culture [27].
Yet, rather than attempt to change the social and ped-
agogical access to better knowledge and Culture con-
temporary social theory has focused on the producers of 
knowledge, their social context and power relations, while 
paying insufficient attention to the distinctions between 
different types of knowledge. 
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The “imperative” for a Decolonized geography does 
not offer an epistemological account for disciplinary 
knowledge. What it lacks is a basis for evaluating what 
counts as geographical knowledge, how geographical 
knowledge can be tested and evaluated, and how can it 
advance. We can begin to see some answers to these ques-
tions by drawing upon the sociological theory of social 
realism. This is introduced below before being applied to 
geography. 
4. Towards a Social Realist Theory of Knowl-
edge
For some time, sociological debates about knowledge 
have been stuck between two positions: positivism and 
constructivism. Young and Muller [28] suggest that neither 
provides an adequate account of knowledge; both being 
tied to an ideology and ends extrinsic to knowledge. 
Positivism is associated with an “under-socialised” view 
of knowledge where its givenness is assumed rather than 
explained. This position is often associated with cultural 
elitism and the defence of tradition, with knowledge, 
largely unchanging, being handed down from generation 
to generation. As noted above, social constructivism 
tends towards an “over-socialised” view of knowledge 
in which knowledge is treated as simply the expressions 
of the knower. Here, authority is vested in who produced 
the knowledge rather than the value of the knowledge 
itself. 
However, in recent years social realism has emerged as 
a theory to explain how knowledge can be both social and 
“real” at the same time. By real I mean that knowledge has 
an objective quality, so is more than just a construct of the 
author’s imagination and is therefore able to capture some 
essence of the object under investigation. Here, social real-
ists draw on critical realism and the work of Roy Bhaskar: 
“Realism is important because of the way in which the 
principle of ontological realism provides the basis for a 
non-positivistic (non-empiricist) rebuttal of constructivist 
relativism” report Maton and Moore [29]. If the world exists 
beyond the human imagination then it is through human 
consciousness that we come to know it. Moore notes the 
coincidence between critical realism and Marxism in the 
form of “materialism and the concept of ‘emergence’ both 
in relation to the characteristics of scientific thought and in 
terms of the nature of ‘the social’ ” [30]. 
Therefore, social realism aims to understand knowledge 
as produced in a given cultural and social context (emer-
gence), but at the same time aiming to describe something 
real – be it an aspect of the natural or human world. To 
better understand knowledge types and the different forms 
means “taking seriously” the question of the “internal 
ordering of symbolic forms”, suggests Moore[31]. One im-
portant aim is to understand the distinctiveness of knowl-
edge types, including academic and vocational knowl-
edge, suggesting that boundaries between disciplines 
are important and not arbitrary, and also how knowledge 
changes and advances over time. Social realists are also 
very interested in how knowledge is “re-contextualised” 
in curricula, both at university and school levels. Contem-
porary social realists, including Karl Maton, Rob Moore, 
Johan Muller, Elizabeth Rata, Michael Young and Leesa 
Wheelahan, draw on the earlier epistemological work of 
Émile Durkheim, Lev Vygotsky, Basil Bernstein and Ernst 
Cassirer. 
Durkheim’s distinction between the sacred and the pro-
fane provides a useful starting point for social realism be-
cause he sought to understand that some knowledge was 
context-independent, while at the same time being a prod-
uct of social relations. For Durkheim, sacred knowledge 
existed at a different level and played a different (moral) 
role in society than profane knowledge. Young [32] applies 
this distinction to the difference between every day con-
cepts and the theoretical concepts that make up specialist 
knowledge. He notes that it is the purpose of schools and 
universities to induct young people into specialist forms 
of knowledge and ways of thinking. 
But, of course, theoretical knowledge came from 
somewhere. It has a history and cultural context which 
should be acknowledged and considered, as the Decol-
onizing movement is keen to remind us. Lloyd traces 
the evolution of disciplinary thinking back to Ancient 
Greece, Rome, China, South Asia, Islamic territories, 
among other cultural hearths[33]. While there is qualita-
tive difference between “emergent disciplinary thought” 
and more modern systematised knowledge which has 
undergone “scientification” suggests Burke, the one has 
emerged from the other. In Disciplines in the Making 
Lloyd [35] details the historical evolution of intellectual 
thought in different regions of the world, including the 
diffusion of ideas and texts between regions. For in-
stance, scholarly works from Ancient Greece and Rome 
were translated into Arabic, where knowledge was ad-
vanced in several areas (mathematics, geography, litera-
ture and philosophy) during the expansion of the Muslim 
Empire in the Middle Ages. In mathematical geography, 
the size and shape of the earth were calculated, as were 
the solar length of a year and the Precession of the Equi-
noxes, reported Ziauddin Alavi[36]. Hydrological studies 
were conducted of the Nile and the canal systems of 
Mesopotamia, including the search for “hidden water” in 
mountains. Al-Mas’udi and al-Idrisi were two prominent 
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geographers who studied environmental effects on life 
and the qualities of people in different climate zones. So, 
when geographers such as Derickson[37] and Pulido[38] 
posit the “unbearable whiteness of geography” they are 
not acknowledging the contribution of other cultures to 
the emergence of disciplinary thought, both in the past 
and present university setting. 
Let us now look more closely at how disciplinary 
knowledge is made or comes into being. Social realism 
claims that the objectivity of truth claims depends upon (1) 
their external validity – they explain objects of study in a 
convincing way, (2) their internal consistency – that they 
are coherent and follow logic, and (3) their ability to in-
voke support from a specialist community of experts and 
with a wider legitimacy. 
Starting with their external validity, the concepts that 
we have created aim to capture an essence or aspect of 
the particular object of study, in geography’s case - the 
surface of the earth. Social realists such as Wheelahan [39] 
call this the aboutness of knowledge – the relationship 
between knowledge and the object being accounted for. In 
geography, we use concepts that are about both the natural 
world (rivers, atmosphere, rocks, landscape) and concepts 
about the human world (settlements, economies, political 
territories, development). 
We have Ernst Cassirer [40] to thank for depicting how 
the process of objectification (concept formation) is dif-
ferent for natural concepts and cultural concepts, resulting 
in different forms of knowledge in the natural sciences 
and social sciences or humanities. With natural objects the 
concept can potentially subsume the object and does this 
through empirical verification. On the other hand, with hu-
man constructs (social sciences and humanities) concepts 
are mediated by other concepts and so the relationship is 
less direct and potentially less precise. Nevertheless, in 
both sciences the aim is the same: “achieving the maxi-
mum absorption of the object by the concept” and also “the 
maximum abstraction or objectification possible under 
the circumstances consistent with the nature of the objects 
under study”, suggest Young and Muller [41]. However, as 
observed by Harstshorne [42] it is also important to recog-
nise that no concept can capture the complete essence of 
an object and that disciplines often have unique concepts 
because they are asking particular questions about their 
object of study. That said, geographers “borrow” many 
concepts from other disciplines like meteorology, biology, 
geology, economics, demography and political science. 
Yet, we geographers use them in a unique way because we 
are interested in location, spatial arrangements and human 
– environment interactions [43-45]. 
Of course, concepts do not exist in isolation. Each 
concept relates to and is inferred from another concept – 
referred to by Brandon as inferentialism [46]. Disciplines 
themselves are made up of large networks of inter-related 
concepts with their own internal logic. Understanding the 
inferential relations of concept formation has significant 
pedagogical implications for teaching and also for cur-
riculum planning. Already, we can see that the distinctive 
approach of a discipline will result in the construction of a 
framework or system of concepts unique to its way of in-
terpreting its object of study. Learning a discipline means 
entering into the system and comprehending its particular 
framework of concepts. 
The educational theorist Basil Bernstein [47] differenti-
ated between knowledge that is hierarchical versus knowl-
edge that is horizontal in structure. Hierarchical knowl-
edge progresses through increased levels of abstraction, 
as with the natural sciences. Greater levels of abstraction 
facilitate understanding of relationships, powerful expla-
nations and the establishment of generalisations or laws. 
With knowledge that demonstrates horizontal structure, 
knowledge progresses through adding new segments of 
knowledge that are distinctive, but related, to the previous 
knowledge, as with the arts, humanities and some social 
sciences. Geography demonstrates aspects of both hierar-
chical and horizontal structure because the knowledge is 
segmented (into sub-disciplines of geomorphology, tour-
ism, economic geography), but hierarchical within seg-
ments. It is not being suggested that disciplines fit neatly 
into Bernstein’s framework. Rather, his analysis provides 
us with an analytical tool to comprehend how knowledge 
can progress in different ways.  
Finally, disciplines have historically tested and es-
tablished procedural knowledge – methods of enquiry 
for conducting and scrutinising research, as well as for 
critique and the verification of findings. This includes the 
review and communication of research findings through 
publication. This involves scholars reading and comment-
ing on the reliability of the work produced, and its accept-
ability for distribution within the disciplinary community. 
Drawing on Karl Popper’s notion of falsification in the 
sciences, it is the openness to challenge and the processes 
of verification within specialist communities that make 
knowledge a social product, and gives rise to its reliability 
[48]. Again, there are important pedagogical implications if 
we are aiming to teach students to make judgements be-
tween better and weaker knowledge claims. 
Drawing on Hannah Arendt, Frank Furedi speaks to 
the centrality of judgement to scholasticism: “The test-
ing of ideas, the questioning of colleagues’ views, and 
the pursuit of intellectual clarity require the freedom to 
judge” [49]. Importantly, one must remember that what is 
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being judged, recounts Furedi, is ideas not people. This 
distinction can get missed in an academic environment 
that treats people and ideas as one, whereupon the act of 
judgement can be perceived “as directed at an individ-
ual’s identity and assumes that everything is personal” 
(author’s italics) [50]. Failure to distinguish between ideas 
and the person not only avoids the disciplinary frame-
work in which ideas are test, but also denies the potential 
for agreement that can arise out of disagreement. In the 
words of Arendt, “judging is one, if not the most, im-
portant activity in which this sharing-of-the-world-with-
others comes to pass” [51]. 
While each discipline has its own unique purpose, ob-
ject of study, conceptual framework, modes of thought 
and methods for validating and acquiring new knowledge, 
these are by no means fixed and within the same disci-
pline there often co-exist different approaches, methods 
and organising concepts or frameworks. And, as noted by 
Polyani [52], in each there is an aspiration for Truth – they 
seek to describe and account for some aspect of reality. 
The pursuit of truth is not as distant from the social con-
structivist position as some might think, since it contains 
within it its own claim to truth, as Rob Moore reveals: “all 
truth is standpoint relative, except the truth that all truth 
is standpoint relative” [53]. In order to induct young people 
into disciplinary ways of thinking a robust understanding 
of the discipline’s epistemic relations is necessary. Stu-
dents don’t just need knowledge. They need to learn how 
the discipline works. 
5. Geography as Disciplinary Knowledge
Tim Cresswell suggests that two questions underpin the 
geographical tradition: 
“[W]hat is the connection between the human and 
physical worlds?” 
And, “how can we account for spatial difference?” [58]
Cresswell finds the embryonic form of geographical 
concepts in the writings of Ptolomy, Eratosthenes, Plato 
and Aristotle. Plato used the terms chora and topos in his 
discussion of the process of becoming. Chora refers to the 
place or setting for becoming and topos was the achieved 
place. However, important to the establishment of the 
modern discipline was the relationship between the partic-
ular and the universal, as Sarah Radcliffe observes: “Ge-
ographers have of course engaged, albeit through widely 
divergent lenses, with the universal and the particular for 
much of its disciplinary history” [54]. 
This distinction was articulated through the work of 
nineteenth century geographers including Immanuel Kant, 
Alexander Humboldt, Karl Ritter and Alfred Hettner. Yet, 
if we were to “Decolonize geography” and replace it with 
a particularistic epistemology with no relationship to the-
oretical knowledge, then it would cease to be a discipline. 
What is important to understand, suggest Winch [56] is why 
and how both the universal (theoretical or propositional 
knowledge) and the particular (contextual or empirical 
knowledge) work together to achieve epistemic ascent. 
Kant lectured in physical geography for 30 years at 
Königsberg (now Kaliningrad). Finding the subject dis-
organised and lacking direction he proposed two ways of 
classifying empirical data: in accordance with their na-
ture or in relation to their position in time and place. The 
former being a logical classification is a precondition for 
studying the spatial variation of particular geographical 
“layers” or phenomena (systematic geography / proposi-
tional knowledge). The latter is a physical classification 
and provides the basis for the study of the interaction of 
phenomena in given places and regions (regional geog-
raphy / contextual knowledge). For Kant, between them 
history and geography were able to fill the total span of 
scientific knowledge – history being the study of time and 
geography the study of space. 
Humboldt (1769-1859) and Ritter (1779-1859) also 
conceived of geography as the study of the inter-rela-
tionship between phenomena in a given locale. However, 
Hartshorne[57] suggests that only later did they become 
aware of Kant’s work and that they may well have ar-
rived at a similar conception independently. They also 
developed a scientific method for geography, taking an 
empirical approach to their studies of Central America 
(Humboldt) and Central Asia (Ritter). Through extensive 
fieldwork and data collection Humboldt and Ritter went 
beyond description in their quest for identifying patterns 
and relationships through a comparative method. Hum-
boldt called his scientific approach physikalische (not 
to be confused with physical geography) through which 
he sought to establish relations between the flora, fauna, 
humankind, and conditions of landscape and climate. 
The concept of Landshaft (a small regional unit) became 
popular amongst German geographers who were seeking 
to find unity and purpose in the landscape (a similar tra-
dition evolved in France with pays identified by Vidal de 
La Blache in his (1908) Tableau de la Geographie de la 
France). For Ritter this unity was god given, while Hum-
boldt leaned towards aesthetic interpretation. 
So, while Humboldt and Ritter were very interested in 
the particularities of small regional units through their no-
mothetic approach they were also looking for generalisa-
tions. What would later be known as systematic geography 
involved the creation of concepts, models, theories and 
principles about how things are spatially related (proposi-
tional or conceptual knowledge). Geographers do this by 
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examining one geographical phenomenon (e.g. glaciation 
or population) at a time – how it varies in space and how 
it is influenced by other phenomena. Systematic geo-
graphical knowledge has evolved as a series of sub-dis-
ciplines (geomorphology, climatology, urban geography, 
political geography, feminist geography) each of which 
is related to its own branch of science (geology, meteo-
rology, planning/urban studies, political science, feminist 
social theory). Geographers draw from these individual 
sciences using the concepts constructed for the study of its 
specific object (lithosphere, atmosphere, settlements, po-
litical ideas/institutions, social categories). However, the 
geographer utilises these concepts for a different purpose: 
to comprehend spatial relationships and patterns. Because 
geographers are interested in how objects are associated 
with other objects they may modify generic concepts or 
invent new ones (e.g. sphere of influence). 
The value of nomothetic science is that by abstracting 
from the real world we can begin to see patterns of be-
haviour and relationship that are not apparent at a more 
concrete level. With the systematic approach geographers 
are seeking explanations of the behaviour and patterns of 
phenomena. Its knowledge structure is often hierarchical 
– aiming for greater precision, certainty and truth [58]. 
When constructing propositional knowledge the dan-
ger is that the theory becomes too removed from the real 
world and unable to explain the behaviour of the phe-
nomena in question. Sciences often experience a tension 
between the need for universal laws and the facts and cir-
cumstances of particular cases. Therefore, disciplines need 
contextual (empirical) knowledge – the facts, data and 
observations of human and physical features of the earth’s 
surface. By its very nature contextual knowledge cannot 
be abstract, although it may be interpreted with the help of 
generic concepts or theories. In contrast to propositional 
knowledge, it is horizontal in structure; so that studying 
new places and regions adds to existing knowledge – but 
sideways rather than hierarchically. 
However, regional geography is more than the compi-
lation of facts about a locale. Rather, Frances Slater sug-
gests the regional geographer asks: “What are the inter-re-
lationships among phenomena that produce this particular 
set of features?” [59] This task requires synthesising knowl-
edge from geography’s sub-disciplines, notes Gilbert:
Cultural, political and economic processes together 
shape and structure the specific regions under investiga-
tion and it is only through the study of their interrelation-
ships that the regional specificity can be retraced. Such a 
study involves a process of synthesis, a process that takes 
the results of analysis, the detailed studies of particular 
aspects of society and draws out the web of relationships 
that generates and binds them to produce spatial differen-
tiation.[60]
This means that places and regions are a product of a 
complex web of interactions, which presents a challenge 
of selecting the geographical criteria to study and also 
the starting point. Hartshorne suggests that no geograph-
ical phenomena should be discounted if one is aiming to 
depict something whole. However, not all geographical 
phenomena are equally significant in shaping the charac-
ter of a region. The character of regions can be strongly 
influenced by topography, proximity to oceans, climate, 
resources, flora and fauna, culture, population, political 
and economic history, and more. The selection of features 
and aspects to study is subjective, but purposeful: explor-
ing the relationships that together give rise to particular 
characteristics or patterns. 
It should now be clear that the discipline of geography 
depends upon both theoretical and contextual knowledge. 
As Phil Gersmahl notes, students of geography must study 
both systematic and regional knowledge because, “The in-
terplay between topical and regional perspectives is what 
stimulates thought” [61]. 
If geographical generalisations, models and principles 
are of value they must necessarily explain aspects of the 
real world. This can be done by testing or applying them 
in different contexts. This does not mean that models will 
perfectly predict patterns and behaviour on the surface 
of the earth. However, in order to say something mean-
ingful about spatial arrangements we should be able to 
find evidence of their principles at work. In the course of 
applying generic models and principles the geographer 
may well discover imperfections and errors, forcing them 
to go away and refine their ideas and models. The pro-
cess of hypothesising, testing, analysis and verification of 
knowledge comes from procedural knowledge. So, while 
the reliability and value of generic concepts and theories 
are dependent upon their application in different contexts 
Hartshorne found that “regional geography in itself is 
sterile; without the continuous fertilisation of generic con-
cepts and principles from systematic geography it could 
not advance to higher degrees of accuracy and certainty in 
interpretation of its findings” [62]. 
We can surmise that geography is an integrative dis-
cipline. While knowledge in its sub-disciplines may be 
organised hierarchically, what matters to the geographer 
is the ability to understand the connections across areas of 
systematic knowledge and apply these to explain spatial 
patterns and places. 
6. Conclusion
In conclusion we can see two very different visions of 
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education and the individual emerging between a par-
ticularistic and a universalist approach to epistemology. 
Furedi[63] reminds us that historically the role of the 
university was to enable the individual to transcend the 
limitations of their personal experience and background. 
This was possible because of the transformative potential 
of knowledge or we can say that disciplinary knowledge 
is “powerful” [64]. 
There are three ways in which disciplinary knowledge 
is powerful. First, from knowledge comes understanding. 
While learning involves posing questions and wondering 
at the way things are in the world, as we come to under-
stand and gain clarity of insight. Here, our wonder about 
things has been replaced by a wonder at them, “to amaze-
ment at the structure of things and our capacity to grasp 
this structure”, surmises Kronman[65]. The idea of thresh-
old concepts has been theorised by Meyer and Land [66] as 
a way to denote the transformative impact that learning 
has on the way a student sees the world. Once a student 
has stepped over a particular educational threshold to a 
higher or more sophisticated level of comprehension they 
will forever see things differently. 
Here, we can see the transformative potential of knowl-
edge. Not only does it transform understanding, but it also 
transforms the individual because it develops their critical 
faculties (a second sense of power). In geography, Lam-
bert[67] notes how the acquisition of deep and explanatory 
knowledge develops the relational thinking that underpins 
geographical thought and a propensity to apply the anal-
ysis of alternative social, economic and environmental 
futures to particular places contexts. Similarly, Alaric 
Maude surmises that disciplinary knowledge in geogra-
phy provides students with “new ways of thinking about 
the world”, “powerful ways of analysing, explaining and 
understanding’, “power over their own knowledge” and it 
“enables young people to follow and participate in debates 
on significant local, national and global issues” [68]. 
Maude’s final point takes us to the third sense in which 
knowledge is powerful: it transforms their capacity to 
act in and contribute to society. This point is echoed by 
Wheelahan who suggests that class divisions are likely to 
be reinforced because “unless students have access to the 
generative principles of disciplinary knowledge, they are 
not able to transcend the particular context” [69]. Similarly, 
Rata also finds such generative principles and the ability 
to transcend context as essential to the social contract that 
underpins liberal democracies, because “one is the condi-
tion for the other” [70]. 
Rata’s observation is prescient because it highlights 
how education (schools and universities) and society 
work together to foster progressive ideals. However, 
the reverse is also true. The contemporary movement to 
Decolonize geography, and the curriculum more broadly, 
arises out of very different social conditions: a move-
ment away from a common understanding of the human 
condition towards a form of cultural and biological de-
terminism (a university replaced by a pluriversity). Thus, 
Furedi worries that “where cultural politics has become 
so prominent in higher education” there is the potential 
that “its values directly contradict those of the universi-
ty”[71]. Hence, the transformative potential of disciplinary 
knowledge could potentially be undermined if the “fos-
silisation of identity accomplished through reducing 
students to the workings of their culture dispossesses 
people of their individual agency and capacity for moral 
autonomy” [72]. 
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